Employment protection legislation is generally blamed for reducing labour turnover and increasing the duration of unemployment. This paper argues that a proper evaluation of employment protection requires a model where there is need for it. The model in this paper gives an insurance role to employment protection in the absence of perfect insurance markets. It is shown that there is a role for both severance payments and advance notice of termination and that if they are chosen optimally, unemployment insurance does not in ‡uence equilibrium employment. Simulations show that if employment protection is chosen optimally it does not reduce job creation.
Introduction
The question of "labor market ‡exibility" has attracted a lot of attention in the European policy debate. It is often blamed for the apparently poor performance of European labor markets, when compared for example with the performance of the US labor market. A popular view amongst policy commentators is that the rapid technological change and increased integration of the world's economies during the last 25 years required fast structural change in the industrialized world. Whereas the United States could rely on its ‡exible markets for the accommodation of this change, European countries su¤ered from anachronistic institutions which slowed down change -leading to a large increase in unemployment, failure to increase employment amongst "minority" groups and failure to take advantage of the technological revolution: the term "eurosclerosis" is often used to capture the apparent European failure in this connection. 1 Labour market institutions are not the only ones that are blamed for eurosclerosis but they are certainly central to the argument. My objective in this paper is to take one such institution, "employment protection", and investigate the economic foundations of the argument that it has contributed to eurosclerosis. My analysis is purely theoretical. One of my contentions is that much of the debate about employment protection has been conducted within a framework that is not suitable for a proper evaluation of its role in modern labour markets. I recommend a framework for the conceptual and eventually empirical evaluation of employment protection that is di¤erent from those in the literature, in the key sense that employment protection has an economic role to play in the employer-employee relationship.
The popular perception is that employment protection contributed to the failure of European labor markets to adapt to new conditions, and the less of it there is, the better. Amongst others, the OECD's Jobs Study (1994) encouraged its members to increase the ‡exibility of their labor markets by reducing employment protection, and the majority of countries have responded positively to this recommendation (see OECD 1999a). But rigorous econometric testing has not been able to conclude that employment protection has a big impact on labor market performance. The OECD, in its recent thorough review of the evidence about the in ‡uence of employment protection on labor market performance, concluded that stricter employment protection does not appear to in ‡uence mean unemployment rates or the ratio of employment to population (OECD, 1999b) . There is some weak evidence that it may marginally bene…t prime-age male workers, at the expense of all other groups (youths, women, older men). It also concluded that stricter employment protection reduces labor turnover, with tenures in both jobs and unemployment lasting longer. The most robust conclusion that it could reach, however, is the seemingly unimportant one that stricter employment protection is associated with more self-employment. 2 This is very weak evidence of any harmful e¤ects that employment protection may have on labor market performance. Looking brie ‡y at the impact on self employment, the explanation is that stricter employment protection laws encourage more self employment because self employment is a way of avoiding the employment protection regulations. 1 Representative references where institutions and their implications for ‡exibility are discussed include Layard et al (1991) , Bertola (1999) , OECD (1994 OECD ( , 1999 , Nickell and Layard (1999) , Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) , Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) and Blanchard (1999) . 2 Although some authors claim that employment protection reduces employment, most recently for example Di Tella and MacCullogh (1999) , the consensus view agrees by and large with the OECD study's main …nding, i.e. that it reduces labour turnover but has no appreciable in ‡uence on mean unemployment.
But (to my knowledge) no models of self employment have been developed and rigorously tested with a view to establishing that the reason for the higher self-employment in countries with stricter employment protection is indeed the stricter employment protection.
The traditional explanation for the other two …ndings, the di¤erential impact on prime-age men and the longer durations of both employment and unemployment, is that employment protection reduces both employment terminations and job creation. Empirically, it so happens that the balance shifts marginally in favor of more employment for prime-age men but against the employment of all other groups, who do not have su¢ciently long job tenures to bene…t from the protection. Moreover, with fewer job terminations and less job creation, in ‡ows into and out ‡ows from both employment and unemployment are lower.
The analysis of employment protection has been mostly conducted within a framework that does not justify its existence. Exogenous policy on employment protection is introduced into models of labor market equilibrium and the e¤ects on job creation, wage determination and job terminations are computed. In such a framework it is hard to see any bene…cial e¤ects of employment protection, beyond the obvious one of making jobs last longer. Even this, however, is not bene…cial if the match is unproductive. Yet, workers usually seek employment protection and employers do not appear to oppose it as vigorously as some economists do. Why? In this paper I will take a di¤erent view of employment protection. I will restrict myself to models which suggest a reason for the existence of employment protection, the insurance of workers against income risk. This indeed must be the reason that workers want employment protection. Firms do not oppose it because by o¤ering it to their employees, they are able to reduce the per-unit cost of labor, either through higher productivity on e¢ciency-wage type arguments or by reducing mean wages for given productivity. It is also argued sometimes that employment protection increases the incentives for workers and …rms to engage in training in …rm-speci…c skills, but it is di¢cult to see why …rms and workers will need legislation to protect them from not wasting …rm-speci…c skills. In contrast, there are reasons for mandatory employment protection when the reason for it is job security, even though on ex ante grounds both …rms want the employment protection.
In the presence of complete insurance markets the need to insure workers through employment protection does not arise. But perfect insurance markets in the environment of my model cannot develop because of moral hazard. The market response to the moral hazard is to introduce employment protection.
The advantage from working with this framework is that I can derive both the optimal level of job protection and its e¤ects on labor market performance within the same framework. I show that the extent to which private insurance can be bought, and the gap between income in work and unemployment insurance, are important in ‡uences on employment protection.
The cost of providing additional income insurance through delayed dismissal is that some jobs continue in operation, although on e¢ciency criteria they should be destroyed. The common argument against employment protection made in the literature, that it reduces new job creation, is not always supported. I show that well-designed ‡exible employment protection does not reduce job creation, because it makes the total job package o¤ered to the worker more attractive. But purely administrative costs of employment terminations, which I do not consider, almost certainly reduce both job creation and job destruction in my framework, as in other models, since they make turnover more expensive.
I will make use of a model of search and matching under rational expectations about the stochastic processes and policies that in ‡uence job creation, job destruction and labor turnover. The key new assumption is that workers are risk averse and choose their strategies in order to maximize the lifetime utility of consumption. Firms are risk neutral because they are more diversi…ed and have better access to capital markets. If this is reminiscent of the static "implicit contract theory" of the 1970s it is intentionally so (Azariadis 1975 , Baily 1974 and Gordon 1974 . My two main theoretical results are dynamic generalizations of the two main results of the static theory. The …rst main result of the static theory is the celebrated "real wage rigidity," and the second the less celebrated "over-employment." The …rm o¤ers a contract that insures the worker against wage ‡uctuations whilst employed and (in the absence of severance payments) against employment ‡uctuations in the event of large negative shocks. 4 The insurance results that hold in my model are similar to the results of the static theory, but in contract to that theory, the important new result that I derive is closer to the over-employment result than to the wage rigidity one.
Even in the presence of optimal severance payments, but in the absence of perfect unemployment insurance, there are con…gurations of the parameters that will make the 4 The "real wage rigidity" result was in the original papers and it caused a lot of controversy -and confusion -because it was mistakenly thought to provide a foundation for employment ‡uctuations and rigid wages. In fact it provided reasons for the separation of the wage decision from the employment decision, i.e. for a movement away form the labor demand curve. The over-employment result was noted later. See Akerlof and Miyazaki (1979) and Pissarides (1981) for independent and di¤erent demonstrations. For discussions of the literature that followed the original models see, e.g., Hart (1983) and Rosen (1985) . …rm want to keep the worker employed in unproductive jobs. The extension of the employment contract, however, is not inde…nite. An advance "notice of dismissal" will be given similar to the one that we …nd in employment protection laws. Providing insurance through severance payments does not introduce deadweight costs but the insurance that can be provided is of limited value. It insures the savings of employed workers against the employment hazard but it cannot insure the savings of the unemployed against the unemployment hazard. An advance notice of dismissal can provide additional income insurance. It has two implications. It spreads employment income over a longer time horizon, by lengthening the job tenure, and so endogenizes the gap between employment and unemployment income; and secondly, it induces search on the job, and so it introduces a positive probability that the worker will move from the current job to a more productive one without the income loss associated with unemployment. Both these implications provide additional insurance against income risk due to job loss.
Equilibrium search models with non-linear utility are notoriously di¢cult to solve analytically. The small number that have appeared in the literature have been solved numerically (Costain 1995 , Valdivia 1995 and Andolfatto and Gomme 1996 . Although I will report some numerical results, one of the purposes of this paper is to show how non-linear utility can be introduced into search models in tractable ways. 5 I will begin by looking at the types of employment protection regulations in practice in industrial countries by drawing on the recent thorough study by the OECD (1999b). In section 3 I de…ne the market structure and in 4 I show the di¤erence between severance payments and notice of dismissal. In section 5 I work out the full solution when there is a complete set of insurance markets and show why moral hazard will prevent them from developing. I then demonstrate, in section 6, how severance payments and advance notice can jointly provide income insurance in the absence of a full set of markets. Sections 7 and 8 work out the implications of the model for equilibrium job creation and job destruction. Some remarks on policy implications are collected in the concluding section 9.
Types of employment protection
Employment protection encompasses any set of regulations, either legislated or written in labour contracts, that limit the employer's ability to dismiss the worker without delay or cost. The OECD has collected detailed information on …ve kinds of employment protection. The emphasis in all cases is legislated employment protection, because of 5 Similar arguments have recently been made for non-linear utility by Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) . Their rule for optimal unemployment insurance (in their static framework) is similar to the rule that I derive for optimal employment protection in a dynamic model. I develop the model more formally and solve it for consumption choices in Pissarides (2000b) . the di¢culty of obtaining information on privately negotiated contracts. Their rankings, however, are closely related to the subjective rankings of the di¢culty of dismissal that have been compiled from survey data by Di Tella and MacCulloch (1999) . The …ve kinds of employment protection listed by the OECD are:
1. Administrative procedures. This includes requirements such as writing to the employee concerned or to an organization, for example a trade union, giving reasons for the dismissal, the length of time that the employer has to wait for a response etc.
2. Notice of termination. The length of notice varies by tenure and includes a period of delay, during which the notice is issued but does not become e¤ective.
3. Severance payment, which again varies by length of service.
4. Di¢culty of dismissal. This category includes mainly the possibility of a challenge by the employee for "unfair dismissal" and the leniency with which the law and courts in di¤erent countries deal with such appeals.
5. Additional measures for collective dismissals. Some countries impose more costs and inconveniences if the dismissals exceed a prescribed number, usually about 10 workers in the same production unit.
My main interest is in types 2 and 3, which are a transfer from the employer to the employee. One way of looking at the advance notice of termination is as an information transfer from the employer to the worker, which has some economic value. A severance payment is a direct transfer of money from the employer to the worker upon termination of the contract. Perhaps surprisingly, the implications of these two types of …ring cost have not been studied as extensively as the other types, although there are exceptions; for example, Lazear (1990) on severance payments and Boeri (1999) on noti…cation notice.
Types 1, 4 and 5 appear to be mainly ways of making it di¢cult for the employer to dismiss a worker without any apparent immediate …nancial gain to the employee. Employers may be discouraged from dismissing employees for fear that they may be engaged in lengthy and expensive negotiations, or that they may be challenged in the courts. This type of "…ring cost" has been studied extensively in the literature and it is the one that is mainly held responsible for reducing both job creation and job destruction. It is relevant to my argument only to the extent that it acts to delay a dismissal, or induce the employer to "bribe" employees to avoid lengthy negotiations, and so act as a form of transfer or advanced notice of termination. Table 1 summarizes the OECD's new data on the minimum length of notice required by law before dismissal (including the number of days required before notice becomes e¤ective), the minimum severance payment and the OECD's administrative and overall index of strictness of employment protection legislation (which range from 0 for the least restrictive to 6). For notice of termination, severance payments and the administrative index I report only data for regular employment of 4 years tenure. Only restrictions in legislation are reported; private contracts often have their own clauses about severance payment and notice of termination but data are di¢cult to get. 6 The table shows a lot of variation in the strictness of employment protection legislation, which according to the OECD has shown a lot of persistence between the late 1980s and the late 1990s. In terms of overall strictness, the six countries with the least restrictive legislation are the six English speaking countries in the sample, headed by the United States and followed by the United Kingdom. The four countries with the strictest protection are the four southern European countries, followed by France.
There are several notable variations in the types of employment protection adopted. The requirement of minimum severance payment is more rare than the requirement of notice, with some exceptions. For example Spain, one of the most restrictive countries overall, requires only one month of notice after four years of job tenure, but imposes very high severance payments. By contrast, Sweden requires much longer notice but does not impose a minimum severance payment at all. Figure 1 shows the administrative strictness index against the weighted sum of notice and severance payment (compiled by the OECD on a comparable 0-6 scale). The countries further away from the origin are the ones with more strict employment protection. There is close correlation between the severance payment and notice requirement on the one hand and the administrative cost of dismissal on the other.
Preliminaries: Market Structure
I study the implications of employment protection in the following simpli…ed environment. A …rm owns a productive opportunity (a job) which yields constant output p per period when matched to a worker. The job costs R 2 [0; p) per period to run, referred to as the variable cost of the job. At some rate¸a negative shock arrives which reduces the output of the job to zero. When the shock arrives the …rm either closes down the job and dismisses the worker, or gives the worker notice that the job will terminate and she will be dismissed at some future date. We formalize this idea by assuming, in the continuous time environment adopted in this paper, that notice takes the form of a dismissal probability sdt for a short time interval dt: Thus, dismissal is a Poisson event that arrives at rate s¸0: In the steady state the expected duration of the notice of dismissal is 1=s (Garibaldi 1998). A high s indicates less employment protection and more employment " ‡exibility," in the sense that the …rm can more quickly realize the desired action of destroying the job. Given the continuous time environment, we can assume without loss of generality that a notice is always given and that the only restriction on s is that it should be non-negative. s = 1 is a feasible choice that indicates immediate dismissal without notice (maximum ‡exibility). At the other extreme, s = 0 is also feasible and indicates the absence of dismissal. Jobs in the latter case terminate only when the worker quits.
When the worker is …red the …rm makes a severance payment to her, in the form of a transfer ¾: The transfer is not made when the worker quits either before or after notice is given, but the structure of the model is such that there will be no quits before notice is issued. 7 Workers have in…nite horizons and are homogeneous. There are frictions in the market that stop the instantaneous matching of unemployed workers and vacant …rms. The frictions are summarized in an aggregate matching function which is introduced later in the analysis. Workers never quit into unemployment or out of the labor force. They are either …red into unemployment, at the end of the notice period, or they quit to take another job. We assume that jobs arrive to employed and unemployed job seekers at the same constant rate a¸0: Unemployed workers earn income b per period, assumed to be an exogenous subsidy. Employed workers earn a wage rate w; which is a choice variable.
The choices that have to be made are with respect to job creation, job destruction, wages, job search and severance payment. In addition, workers choose their consumption levels given their incomes. We now describe who makes these choices and how.
Workers choose their consumption pro…le conditional on their income. I consider consumption choices when the employment and unemployment risks can be insured, and show that (when the rate of time preference is equal to the rate of interest) the consumption pro…le is ‡at and independent of employment status. This is not a feasible equilibrium, because the incentives to search for a job are not present, so I then consider equilibrium when employment and unemployment risks cannot be insured. In order to keep the framework analytically tractable I study the extreme of no borrowing or saving, i.e. when consumption is equal to current income (but see Pissarides, 2000b , for the case of perfect capital markets and no insurance markets).
The choice of wage pro…le becomes key in this case. Employment in the model is the outcome of a two-sided match which creates some local monopoly rents. The commonly used wage equation in this environment is a rent sharing one that is usually derived from the solution to a static Nash bargaining problem (Pissarides, 2000a) . This is one possible wage model for this paper but given the di¤erences in risk attitudes between …rms and workers, a more intuitive wage equation is the one underpinning the "competitive search equilibrium" model of Moen (1997) (used also by Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) to study optimal unemployment insurance in a two-period model). In this framework the …rm posts a wage rate (or a wage rule) and adheres to it throughout the duration of the job. Workers have information about posted wages but because of frictions they do not expect to be o¤ered a job with probability 1 if they apply. They can join a pool of applicants and on the basis of that pool, they are o¤ered the job with some probability less than 1. Workers act competitively, in that they join the pool that maximizes their utility. In equilibrium the wage-pool combinations of all …rms give the same utility to all workers, otherwise job applicants will switch pool. Moen (1997) shows that in decentralized search equilibrium, the competitive search equilibrium assumptions give rise to the unique wage equation that internalizes the search externalities (Hosios, 1990 , Pissarides 2000a . Namely, the wage rate shares the surplus from the job according to the elasticity of the constant-returns matching function with respect to unemployment. The same rule is shown to hold here in the risk-neutral case, but the sharing rule generalizes under risk aversion. The advantage of the competitive search assumptions, however, are mainly in the choice of the notice of termination, s: I show that if the …rm posts a wage rule, a severance payment and a notice period conditional on the arrival of a bad shock, the severance and notice period that maximize the …rm's pro…t correspond to the Pareto choices of the worker.
The choice with respect to job creation follows standard assumptions. Because of frictions, the …rm cannot …ll its job instantaneously. A vacant job costs something to maintain (or create, with identical results) and …rms create jobs up to the point where the extra pro…t from one more job falls to zero. It is shown in Pissarides (2000a, chapter 3) that this assumption corresponds to the assumptions underlying a dynamic labor demand curve with costs of employment adjustment.
Workers choose their consumption levels and whether to search for another job or not conditional on the parameters of the posted employment contract. I assume that search intensity is …xed and do not make explicit the cost of search. I assume instead that search takes place if the rewards from …nding a new job are strictly greater than the rewards currently available to the worker.
The in ‡uence of employment protection on match rents
Before analyzing the choices described in the preceding section, I investigate the e¤ect that a notice period and a severance payment can have on the surplus created by a job. For simplicity I assume that the wage rate is constant throughout the duration of the job, a property that will be shown later to be never suboptimal. I also make the reasonable assumption that the worker who is given notice that the job will terminate searches on the job for another job. If the worker quits to take another job during the notice period, the job is destroyed, otherwise it is destroyed at the end of the notice period. The job's worth to the …rm during the notice period is J n ; and satis…es
There is a perfect capital market with interest rate r; output during the notice period is zero but the job still costs R to keep alive and there are wage payments w: It terminates either when the notice expires, at rate s; or the worker quits, at rate a: When the worker is dismissed into unemployment she is paid the severance payment, but if she quits to another job there is no severance compensation. When the job is productive there is no search on the job, because the worker cannot be made better o¤ by moving, so the job's value to the …rm satis…es,
Note that when the negative shock arrives (at rate¸) the job is not destroyed but gives notice to the worker. The ‡ow income from the productive job is the pro…t rate p¡ R¡ w and when the negative shock arrives the value of the job changes from the value of the productive job J to the value of the unproductive job J n : Solving (1) and (2), we obtain
The second term in the right-hand side of (3) is the loss su¤ered because the job is kept active during an unproductive period (with the exception of the severance payment, which has to be paid anyway). It is maximized when s = 0; when the job is destroyed only when the worker quits and minimized when s = 1; when the only cost of termination is the severance payment ¾:
The present discounted value of income to the worker who is placed on notice of termination is J w n ; de…ned by
The worker is assumed, for the sake of this exercise, that she has access to the same capital market as the …rm. She earns wages w and changes job at rate a: The new job taken is productive and is worth J w : If the search is not successful and the worker is dismissed, an event that takes place at rate s; the reward is the present discounted value of income of the unemployed worker, denoted by V w : Dismissal entitles the worker to severance payment ¾:
The income from unemployment is b and the unemployed change status only when they …nd a job that is worth J w : So V w satis…es the value equation
Finally, the value of a productive job to the worker, J w , satis…es
given that the employed worker earns constant wage stream w and is given notice of termination when the negative shock arrives at the rate¸:
From (4) and (6) we derive,
The interpretation of this equation is similar to that of (3). The …rst term on the righthand side shows the wage payments during the productive phase of the job and the second term shows the gain to the worker from the notice period. The net surplus created by the job match is
the present discounted values of income of the …rm and the worker less the present discounted value of income during unemployment, which has to be given up (under the assumption that the vacant job does not enjoy any income). Substitution from (3) and (7) into (8) gives
But (5) implies that aJ w = (a + r)V w ¡ b; so the surplus from the job becomes
The …rst term on the right-hand side of (10) is independent of the employment protection parameters (note that V w is independent of the choices made by the …rm-worker pair, who are too small to in ‡uence the market outcomes). It shows the present discounted value of output net of the variable cost and reservation wage of the unemployed worker. It is the net surplus created by the match in conventional models without employment protection.
The second term is also independent of the severance payment ¾; which, being a pure transfer from the employer to the worker does not add or subtract from the net surplus created by the job (Lazear 1990 ). But the notice period reduces the surplus from the job. The second term is never positive and strictly negative for all …nite s: It disappears only when no notice is given, i.e. when s = 1:
There are two reasons why a notice period reduces the surplus from the job. First, the variable costs of the job have to be paid during the unproductive phase. Second, when the worker stays employed, she foregoes her unemployment income. Unemployment income is a pure subsidy, so it is a net loss to the pair for the duration of the job. From the purely …nancial point of view, the matched pair would be better o¤ if the unproductive job were given up and the worker claimed her unemployment subsidy.
The fact that the notice period reduces the private surplus from the match makes it more of a puzzle that it is wanted by workers. We show below that if it is wanted, it is because its insurance properties are better than those of the severance payment.
Consumption choices
I assume throughout that the …rm is risk neutral, so its expected returns from a match are as described in the preceding section. The worker, however, is risk averse. Her utility ‡ow is denoted u(c); where c is consumption and utility satis…es the usual regularity conditions. During unemployment, utility at time t is given by
where ± is the rate of pure time preference, a is as before the rate at which unemployment is given up for a job and W (¿ ) is the expected lifetime utility at ¿ when a job is accepted. The latter satis…es
under the assumption that the worker changes from a productive to an unproductive job at the rate¸: The expected lifetime utility from the unproductive job satis…es
given that this state terminates for two reasons, when the worker quits to take a productive job and when she is dismissed into unemployment. The worker maximizes utility in each state by choosing the optimal consumption sequence subject to the budget constraints. We say that there is a full set of insurance markets when the worker can buy annuities in each state that insure her against the risk of income ‡uctuations, due to changes in wages or employment status. We can reason as follows.
Suppose that there is an insurance company that has access to a capital market characterized by the unique interest rate r and which can pool resources to insure against the risk of income ‡uctuation. Let the worker deposit her assets with this insurance company and let the assets of the unemployed worker at some time t be A u (t): The insurance company o¤ers a contract which pays¯during unemployment and a lump sum A w0 when the worker …nds a job. The contract then expires. The rate of returnī s calculated from actuarial fairness. In a short time period dt the insurance company earns rdt on the worker's assets and runs a risk adt of paying A w0 : When it pays the amount A w0 it get to keep the accumulated assets A u . The insurance company pays¯dt for the duration of the contract, so actuarial fairness requires
The unemployed worker's budget constraint is therefore given by
with initial condition A u (0) = A u0 + ¾; given that the unemployed worker receives severance payment ¾:
The budget constraint of employed workers is calculated in similar fashion. The worker on notice deposits assets A n with the insurance company and gets A u0 if she becomes unemployed or A 0 w0 if she becomes directly employed, both of which are choice variables. She also gets severance payment ¾ if she becomes unemployed. Her budget constraint satis…es
with initial condition A n (0) = A n0 : The initial condition is chosen by the worker employed in a productive job, who deposits assets A w and gets back from the insurance company assets A n0 when she is given notice of termination. The budget constraint of those employed in productive jobs therefore satis…es
with initial condition A w (0) = A w0 if the worker came to the job via unemployment or A w (0) = A 0 w0 if she came to it from another job after giving notice of termination. Maximization of lifetime utility with respect to consumption and asset holdings, given some initial asset position, gives the optimal consumption path. In fact, not all asset positions are needed to achieve maximum utility. The way the insurance contract works is that the worker deposits an initial asset with the insurance company and chooses the terminal asset payout so as to achieve the desired consumption sequence between the two dates. Since the worker rotates between employment and unemployment, both initial and terminal asset positions are choice variables. There is an in…nite number of initial and terminal asset positions that can support the same consumption path inbetween. We therefore either pin the asset position down arbitrarily, or by assuming that at some point the worker entered unemployment with exogenously given assets, e.g. 0; and derive the optimal asset positions from there onward. What is of interest to us here, however, is not the asset positions per se but the fact that with the full set of insurance contracts described in equations (15)- (16), there is a unique consumption path that maximizes the utility functions (11)-(13) and which, for r = ±; is stationary. We will make the assumption r = ± and therefore write simply c for the maximizing constant consumption level. For a constant wage rate w (an innocuous assumption in this context) the optimal consumption level can be shown to be c = (r + a)(r + s + a +¸)w +¸s(b + (r + a)¾) (r + a +¸)(r + a + s) :
Substitution now of the constant consumption c into the lifetime utility functions and integration gives,
Lifetime utility is identical in employment and unemployment. Thus complete insurance markets create conventional moral hazard: workers do not have an incentive to search for a job and the market breaks down. Notwithstanding this problem, it is helpful for the later analysis to investigate if there is any role for employment protection in this environment. In order to close the model, suppose that wages are determined by zero-pro…t conditions on …rms. Setting the present discounted value of pro…ts in (3) equal to 0 we obtain the wage equation
and substitution into the consumption equation (18) gives
It follows from this analysis that neither severance payments nor notice of termination have a role to play. Severance payments are irrelevant, as they can be undone by private insurance markets. But the notice of termination makes the equilibrium worse because it reduces consumption. Consumption in equilibrium is monotonically increasing in s, so it is maximized when the employee is dismissed when the job stops being productive. Consumption in this case (s = 1) is c = (r + a)(p ¡ R) +¸b r + a +¸:
The factor behind this result is the loss of job surplus that was highlighted in the preceding section. With a complete set of insurance markets the individual can arrange the income from work in such a way as to maximize consumption. By staying on in unproductive jobs she reduces the lifetime income from work and consumption su¤ers.
Dealing with moral hazard
I discuss here the role of severance payments and dismissal delays in the absence of perfect insurance markets, when the worker is given the freedom to choose both subject to a zero-pro…t constraint on the value of the …rm.
Severance payments
A severance payment is a transfer from the …rm to the worker when the latter joins unemployment. Generally, the worker wants to save during employment to maintain her consumption level during unemployment. In the absence of insurance markets, and because of the risk of the early arrival of negative shock, the worker will want to save a lot at …rst, but less as the job tenure rises and assets accumulate. So the optimal consumption path during employment rises. The severance payment acts as insurance against the early termination of the job: the worker pays a premium in the form of a wage reduction, and the …rm guarantees a payout on termination that is independent of the duration of the job. The optimal payment is chosen so that consumption during unemployment is maintained at a level that is optimal when compared with the consumption level during employment. Formally, the severance payment is a perfect substitute for insurance for employed workers. In the formal model the severance payment plays exactly the role of the insurance bought by employed workers against the event of unemployment, A u0 : Without a notice period, the employed individual takes a wage reduction¸A u0 and receives A u0 from her …rm when the job terminates. With a notice period the expressions change in an obvious way, given the analysis of the preceding section. The main result is that whatever the wage pro…le, the existence of optimal severance payments ensures that the consumption pro…le during employment is ‡at. The …rm becomes the provider of perfect insurance for the employed worker and is a better provider than a third party because it can monitor the worker during employment for moral hazard.
Advance notice of dismissal
The role of an advance notice period is more di¢cult to derive and can best be demonstrated in a model where consumption is equal to income everywhere. For employed workers who can choose their severance payment this assumption is innocuous because the severance payment replaces optimal savings such that the consumption pro…le is ‡at; hence, assuming a ‡at wage pro…le replicates the optimal solution. The loss of generality necessitated by the assumption of no savings is that if the unemployed could save, they would want to choose a large severance payment which they run down gradually during unemployment. I show in Pissarides (2000b) that allowing for this still implies a drop in consumption during unemployment. The main results that I derive in this section are due to the drop in consumption su¤ered during unemployment, which in the model of this section is identical to the drop in income when the individual moves from employment to unemployment.
Without assets the utility ‡ow during employment is u(w(t)); and during unemployment it is u(b): The choice variables are the wage pro…le fw(t)g and the notice of termination s; given the constraint that jobs require compensation R per period and given the arrival rates of new productive opportunities, a, and negative shocks,¸: Our assumption that the unemployed cannot save makes severance payments uninteresting and they are not considered further.
I derive …rst the Pareto optimal choices with respect to the wage pro…le and the dismissal probability under the assumption that workers are risk averse and …rms risk neutral. This will set a standard for the search equilibrium of the next section. The Pareto allocations are chosen by maximizing the employed worker's lifetime utility subject to a zero pro…t constraint on …rms.
The present discounted value of pro…ts (1) and (2) generalize in a natural way when wages are not constant and they are
for a productive job beginning at time 0 and
for the loss su¤ered if the job becomes unproductive in t and a notice of termination is given. Workers who accept productive opportunities are constrained by the requirement that the net PDV of a job has to be nonnegative; i.e. the maximization is constrained by
Utility functions are as in (11)- (13) for ± = r and with consumption during employment constrained by c(t) = w(t) and during unemployment by c(t) = b: A worker who receives a productive opportunity in this environment is confronted with the following maximization problem:
Let ¹ be a co-state variable associated with the constraint. The Euler conditions with respect to the wage path satisfy
for wages in productive jobs and
for wages in unproductive jobs. It immediately follows that the wage path chosen is ‡at and satis…es
This choice is dynamically consistent -no individual will ever choose a varying wage pro…le, given the concave utility function. For a ‡at wage structure the …rm's PDV of pro…t is given by (3) for ¾ = 0 and when an unproductive job is kept on, the loss is
The utility functions satisfy
during unemployment,
when the worker is employed in an unproductive job, and
when she is in a productive job. The bar on the W in (31) and (32) indicates that the utility is the one obtained in a new job that is not in ‡uenced by the parameters of the contract in the present job (although equilibrium will be assumed to be symmetric). The choice of termination period is restricted to a constant dismissal rate s; which cannot be revised on the basis of experience during search on the job after the arrival of the negative shock. When a worker …rst enters a job she receives a contract that speci…es a stationary wage pro…le for an average of 1=¸+ 1=s periods, with s chosen optimally, and no revisions are made to the contract. The choice of s maximizes (32) subject to (25) and so is governed by the sign of @W n =@s + ¹@J n =@ s; which at the stationary w satis…es
Equations (11) and (29) imply that we can write (34) as
The constraint (25) will hold as equality at the maximization point, giving the optimal wage level as
Note that at s = 0; when the job is never terminated,
and at s = 1; when the job is terminated when it becomes unproductive,
Now, s = 0 cannot be an equilibrium because (in symmetric equilibrium) utility functions become
and the economy breaks down because no one has an incentive to search for a productive job. If (35) is positive at all s¸0 we therefore arbitrarily …x s at some low positive value. We will, however, be interested in parameter ranges that imply that if s is …nite it is an interior maximum. For a nonzero s utility functions in symmetric equilibrium satisfy
and
so w > b is su¢cient to ensure that the incentives for search for another job, either when unemployed or employed in an unproductive job, are present. Figure 2 shows the path of income when no notice is given and when it is given. When notice is given the wage falls, as shown in (36) and so the gap between income in work and income out of work is reduced. Also, for given duration of search, the time that the individual spends in unemployment, when income and consumption are lower, is reduced. We will see shortly that the optimal notice period is one that achieves an optimal relation between the wage rate and unemployment bene…t, given that the longer the notice period is, the lower the wage rate becomes. Notice period is given if (35) vanishes at some …nite s and it is not given if (35) is positive at all …nite s: Making use of (35) and (36) we de…ne the function
with w de…ned by (36). Clearly, if u(:) is linear f (s; :) is always positive, con…rming that no notice is given. Notice of dismissal is given only because of its insurance properties. Table 2 reports some numerical results for the optimality of a …nite s: I show the range of the replacement ratio, de…ned by b=w´½; for which the sign of f(s; :) is negative at
The exercise is conducted for a constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function
Since f(s; :) is monotonically increasing in ½; I …nd the value of ½ that implies f (1; ½) = 0: Any value of ½ below this critical value implies that the optimal s is …nite. I denote the critical value of the replacement ratio by ½ max : This is given by
The Table shows the range of ½ for two values of the variable cost of keeping the job active, 0 and 0:3: In the latter case the cost of giving notice is higher so workers need a lower replacement ratio to induce them to stay on the job after it becomes unproductive. The …rst line of the Table con…rms that if there is no risk aversion, the job is always destroyed when it becomes unproductive. Small degrees of risk aversion require only modest unemployment income to induce …ring but once the degree of risk aversion becomes large even generous unemployment insurance is consistent with a notice period.
The properties of the optimal notice period (de…ned by 1=s) can be derived from (42). The three main in ‡uences are already apparent in Table 2 . The key result is that giving advance notice is optimal only if the individual needs insurance; i.e. if she is risk averse and unemployment insurance is insu¢cient. 8 Other in ‡uences on the notice period can be derived from the equilibrium value of the wage rate in (36).
Search equilibrium
We have so far speci…ed the returns of the employer and worker from a job for given arrival rate of jobs. The job destruction rules can be derived from the analysis so far. A fraction s of unproductive jobs is destroyed each period. If productive employment is e and unproductive n; in a steady state the equality¸e = sn holds. Job destruction is given by sn and the job destruction rate by sn=(n + e); which, given that n =¸e=s; is equal to¸s=(¸+ s): Thus, faster arrival of negative shocks or shorter notice periods lead to more job destruction. The commonly made assertion that employment protection (low s) reduces job destruction holds.
I now close the model by analyzing job creation. In order to derive job creation I study a model with wage posting and search frictions, similar to the one studied by Moen (1997) but with in…nite horizons.
Suppose a …rm i in this market has a vacancy to …ll. It posts a wage rate w i (t) and a dismissal rate s i ; conditional on the arrival of a negative shock, an event that takes place at rate¸: Given this posting a number of workers apply to the …rm for the job. Let the ratio of the pool of vacant jobs that post this contract to the pool of applicants be denoted by µ i ; referred to as the tightness of market i: Some of these applicants may be suitable and some not. I assume that the rate of success for each job vacancy i is given by a constant-returns matching function, which de…nes a rate of arrival of workers to vacant jobs q(µ i ); with q 0 (µ i ) · 0 and elasticity ¡´2 (0; 1); assumed for convenience to be constant in the neighborhood of equilibrium. 9 A search equilibrium is de…ned as a wage rule, a termination rule and a market tightness. I will derive the symmetric equilibrium where all …rms o¤er the same wage and termination rule and the tightness of each is equal to the market average.
Job applicants allocate themselves to each pool in such a way that no one can be made better o¤ by changing pool. A worker allocating herself to pool i will match to a job at rate µ i q(µ i ); an implication of the matching technology. The expected returns of this worker from joining pool i generally depend on whether the worker is unemployed or employed on notice of dismissal. I will work out the solution when the …rm posts a wage to attract unemployed job applicants. The solution is not qualitatively di¤erent if it aimed its o¤er at employed job applicants, a point dicussed brie ‡y in footnote 10.
The expected returns of the unemployed applicant are given by U i ; calculated from (11)-(13) when the consumption ‡ow during employment is equal to the posted wage w i (t); the dismissal rate is s = s i ; and the arrival rate of jobs is a = µ i q(µ i ): Let U be the returns from joining the pool with the most attractive posted contract. Then the constraint facing …rm i is
The …rm is assumed to select the posted wage and the dismissal probability by maximizing the PDV of pro…ts from vacant jobs subject to (45). Vacant jobs can enter the market at any time to participate in the matching game. Let V i be the expected pro…ts from joining pool i with a vacant job. I assume that creating the vacant job is costless but maintaining it open and participating in the matching game costs k per period. The value of the vacancy therefore satis…es
with J i denoting the expected pro…t from a …lled job that belongs to pool i: The …rm posts the wage contract that maximizes the value V i : Now, given our assumptions of risk-neutral …rms and risk-averse workers, and our previous results about the optimality of the ‡at wage pro…le, the …rm will choose to post a ‡at wage pro…le. I simplify the derivation of the search equilibrium by imposing the ‡at pro…le from the outset and so de…ne the maximization program as max wi;si;µi
subject to
The transition rates to jobs after the termination of job i and the expected returns from such transitions are unspeci…ed for the moment. Maximization with respect to w i and µ i gives the rules
where ¹ is a Lagrangian multiplier and´is the elasticity of the vacancy's transition rate. From (51) and (52) I derive the sharing rule
For a linear utility function this rule internalizes the search externalities. Maximization with respect to s i gives the following condition for an interior solution
If the expression is positive everywhere the optimal s i is 1 (no notice is given) and if it is negative everywhere, s i takes its (arbitrary) minimum value consistent with search on the job. Making use of (31) and (51) I derive the same condition as in the preceding section for the optimality of an interior s i ; with the conditions for the bounds following easily:
Conditions (53) and (55) are solved for the …rm's wage rate and optimal dismissal policy, given the tightness of its market µ i : Tightness is derived from the search constraint (49), which holds as equality. In order to solve for tightness we need to know the value taken by U; the maximum expected return to the worker from search. I close the model by assuming that the aggregate equilibrium is symmetric, i.e. by writing w = w i ; ¹ W = W i and U = U i : This, however, tells us that tightness is the same in all sub-markets, not what it is. In order to derive the value taken by tightness I impose the usual zero-pro…t condition on new job creation; i.e. assume that …rms will create vacant jobs up to the point where all rents from job creation are exhausted. This gives V i = 0 for all i: Noting condition (46) and (48) and the symmetric equilibrium we derive the job creation condition
The right-hand side of (56) is the expected cost of recruiting a worker and the left hand-side for s = 1 is the net revenue from this worker, p ¡ (w + R): Thus (56) is a generalized demand for labour curve, which equates net revenue to costs when there is a notice period.
Recall that three unknowns fully de…ne the search equilibrium, w; s; µ: The three equations that give their solutions are (53), (55) and (56). We make use of (40) and (41) 10 Equation (53) is the only one that would change if the …rm aimed its o¤er to employed job applicants, because their gain from the o¤er would be W i ¡ W n i and not W i ¡ U i : But equations (40)- (41) show that the two gains are proportional to each other, so nothing of substance changes if we use one rather than the other. and (47) for V = 0 to substitute the value functions out of (53). The result is the new sharing equation
Equations (55)- (57) give unique solutions for w; s and µ: Equation (55) determines wages. With wages given, (56) gives a positively-sloped relation between s and µ and (57) gives a negatively-sloped relation. Their intersection point is the equilibrium solution for s and µ.
The role of employment protection
A numerical illustration of the equilibrium solution is shown in Table 3 . The solution is worked out for an implied mean recruitment cost of 5% of expected output. The implied mean duration of search is 2.7 months and mean duration of notice 1.7 months. In the case where no notice is given the mean duration of unemployment tis 2.7 months but in the case where notice is given it is one month. The employment and unemployment rates are calculated by equating ‡ows in and out of each stock. The results of the Table  show that the notice period does not a¤ect the productive employment rate. If notice is not given, those on notice, about 2% of the labour force, become unemployed, wages rise with virtually no other change. Since workers are risk averse, they are made worse o¤ by this change. Unemployment and its duration are much higher in the absence of notice. Equilibrium satis…es some strong properties with respect to the policy parameters. Making use of the insurance condition (55) to substitute wages out of (57), and then combine (56) and (57), we obtain
The tightness of the market is determined independently of the parameters of the unemployment insurance system or any features of employment protection. Job creation is given by µq(µ)u; the fraction of unemployed workers who …nd jobs, and the job creation rate by µq(µ)u=(1 ¡ u): At given unemployment rate, job creation is therefore µq(µ); and the implication of (58) is that if the notice period is chosen optimally, the policy parameters do not in ‡uence job creation. In order to illustrate further this property, I consider the properties of equilibrium in a diagram with the length of notice (the inverse of s) on the vertical axis and µ on the horizontal (…gure 3). Equation (58) is shown as a vertical line and labelled "equilibrium locus". Equation (56) implies a negative relation between 1=s and µ : in a partial context, the longer the notice required, the lower the job creation. This curve is shown in …gure 3 as a downward-sloping "job creation curve." Now, an increase in unemployment bene…t increases wages through the insurance condition (55) and so shifts the job creation curve down. It does not change the other curve in the …gure. The …nal equilibrium is one of higher wages (not shown), shorter advance noti…cation of dismissal and the same job creation.
Unemployment insurance does not in ‡uence job creation, despite the fact that it increases wages, because of the fall in the notice period, which o¤sets the higher wage costs. This illustrates an important point: employment protection and unemployment insurance are closely linked, and giving more of one and less of the other can neutralize the e¤ects on job creation.
In order to show that the model with exogenous protection replicates the results obtained in the literature, suppose we …x s arbitrarily and study the job creation-wage equilibrium. In …gure 4, I plot (56) and (57), labelled "wage curve" and "job creation curve" respectively, and show the unique equilibrium µ ¤ ; w ¤ : Higher unemployment insurance increases wages as before, by shifting the wage curve up, but because the noti…cation requirement is held …xed, equilibrium moves up the job creation curve, leading to less job creation.
Finally, consider an exogenous reduction in employment protection in the equilibrium described in …gure 4 (…gure 5). For example, suppose the government …xes the advance notice requirement at a level that is above the optimal level implied by (55) and subsequently reduces it. In …gure 5, the job creation curve shifts to the right, and the wage curve shifts up. The e¤ects are the conventional ones of relaxing employment protection: job creation increases because the costs of opening a job are less and wages rise because less time is now spent in the unproductive phase of a job. Although the overall e¤ects on job creation are not clear from the diagram alone, it can be shown by di¤erentiation that job creation increases (at least for large s). Thus, if employment protection is not optimally set, less stringent employment protection increases both job creation and job destruction, as in conventional models.
Conclusions
I have argued that the models used to evaluate employment protection legislation are not usually models that justify the existence of the legislation. I demonstrated that employment protection can provide insurance against income risk, when moral hazard or other problems prevent unemployment insurance from providing su¢cient cover. I conclude by suggesting some policy implications of the analysis.
The …rst question that needs addressing is why should the government be needed to legislate employment protection measures and not leave it to private contracts. This is not a question that I investigated so I cannot give a complete answer. But under the employment protection rules that I derived, the worker pays for the protection in the form of a lower wage rate for the duration of the productive phase of the job and is compensated with higher income when the job is no longer productive and dismissal becomes imminent. One can easily argue that the …rm will have incentives to default on its obligations and terminate the contract without compensating the worker. . Of course, with written employment contracts, a defaulting …rm can be taken to court. But the transfers involved are usually small and if the courts are expensive this is not a realistic option. Legislation can provide a cheaper alternative of enforcing rules that would be optimal in private contracts. In principle, the government can replicate private contracts. But I have shown that the employment protection in private contracts is chosen as part of a package of measures, and when shocks take place the employment protection is changed along with wages and other features of the contract. Without this ‡exibility in the protection legislation the measures may alter the relative bargaining powers of established workers and employers, and alter wages and job creation. Employment protection may then have the kind of implications for the functioning of labor markets that have been discussed in the literature: established workers gaining power relative to others, job tenures increasing and job creation su¤ering.
The unemployment insurance and employment protection regimes are closely intertwined. If the government could legislate optimal unemployment insurance, there would be no need for employment protection. The question why it is easier to legislate employment protection than unemployment insurance, at least in some countries, is a di¢cult one that we cannot address with the model of this paper (because it does not have a model of unemployment insurance). The costs of introducing and running an unemployment insurance scheme will have to be taken into account if the relative merits of the two ways of providing insurance are to be compared. A gain from unemployment insurance, however, that is not usually mentioned in the policy debate but emerges out of our analysis, is that in countries with poor unemployment insurance provision and strict employment protection measures (the southern European states being a good example), making unemployment insurance more generous can have an additional e¢-ciency gain: the dismantling of expensive …ring procedures, and the faster destruction of unproductive jobs. Notes: Source, OECD (1999b). Notice period is the required length of advance notice of dismissal plus the time needed for the notice to become e¤ective, regular employment of at least 4 years tenure. Table 2 .2, page 55. Severance payment is the months salary due to dismissed regular employees of at least 4 years standing. Table 2 .2. The administrative index is a weighted average of the index for procedural inconveniences, di¢culty of dismissal and di¢culty of collective dismissals (the …rst two with equal weight and the third with 0.4 of the others'). Tables 2.2 and 2.4. The overall strictness index is the OECD's summary index of all the indicators listed in the text for all workers ("version 2"). The rank in brackets is the one reported for the late 1980s in the OECD's Jobs Study (and not the one for the 1980s updated in OECD, 1999). Source for both columns, OECD (1999b), Table 2 .5, page 66. The updated rank for the 1980s is virtually identical to the one for the 1990s. Table 2 Values of the replacement ratio below which it is optimal to give notice°R Notes.°is the constant coe¢cient of relative risk aversion, R=p is the cost of running the job per units of output and ½ is the ratio of unemployment compensation to the wage rate. Table 3 Numerical illustration of the search equilibrium Notes. The fraction k=q p=¸i s the mean recruitment cost over the mean output over the life of the job. 1=µq is the mean duration of search and 1=s the mean duration of notice.
e is the steady-state stock of productive employment, n of unproductive employment and u is the unemployment rate. Effects of shorter notice period when it is exogenous Wage curve w*
